The most difficult part in the design and analysis of Learning Automata (LA) consists of the formal proofs of their convergence accuracies. The mathematical techniques used for the different families (Fixed Structure, Variable Structure, Discretized etc.) are quite distinct. Among the families of LA, Estimator Algorithms (EAs) are certainly the fastest, and within this family, the set of Pursuit algorithms have been considered to be the pioneering schemes. Informally, if the environment is stationary, their ε-optimality is defined as their ability to converge to the optimal action with an arbitrarily large probability, if the learning parameter is sufficiently small/large. The existing proofs of all the reported EAs follow the same fundamental principles, and to clarify this, in the interest of simplicity, we shall concentrate on the family of Pursuit algorithms. Recently, it has been reported Ryan and Omkar (J Appl Probab 49(3): [795][796][797][798][799][800][801][802][803][804][805] 2012) that the previous proofs for ε-optimality of all the reported EAs have a common flaw.The flaw lies in the condition which apparently supports the so-called "monotonicity" property of the probability of selecting the optimal action, which states that after some time instant t 0 , the reward probability estimates will be ordered correctly forever. The authors of the various proofs have rather offered a proof for the fact that the reward probability estimates are ordered correctly at a single point of time after t 0 , which, in turn, does not guarantee the ordering forever, rendering the previous proofs incorrect. While in Ryan and Omkar (J Appl Probab 49(3):795-805, 2012), a rectified proof was presented to prove the ε-optimality of the Continuous Pursuit Algorithm (CPA), which was the pioneering EA, in this paper, a new proof is provided for the Absorbing CPA (ACPA), i.e., an algorithm which follows the CPA paradigm but which artificially has absorbing states whenever any action probability is arbitrarily close to unity. Unlike the previous flawed proofs, instead of examining the monotonicity property of the action probabilities, it rather examines their submartingale property, and then, unlike the traditional approach, invokes the theory of Regular functions to prove that the probability of converging to the optimal action can be made arbitrarily close to unity. We believe that the proof is both unique and pioneering, and adds insights into the convergence of different EAs. It can also form the basis for formally demonstrating the ε-optimality of other Estimator algorithms which are artificially rendered absorbing.
adaptive decision-making unit that learns the optimal action from among a set of actions offered by the Environment it operates in. At each iteration, the LA selects one action, which triggers either a reward or a penalty as a response from the Environment. Based on the response and the knowledge acquired in the past iterations, the LA adjusts its action selection strategy in order to make a "wiser" decision in the next iteration. In such a way, the LA, even though it lacks a complete knowledge about the Environment, is able to learn through repeated interactions with the Environment, and adapts itself to the optimal decision.
LA have found applications in a variety of fields, including game playing [3, 4] , parameter optimization [5] , solving knapsack-like problems and utilizing the solution in web polling and sampling [6] , vehicle path control [7] , assigning capacities in prioritized networks [8] , and stochastically optimally allocating limited resources [6, [9] [10] [11] . LA have also been used in natural language processing, string taxonomy [12] , graph patitioning [13] , map learning [14] , service selection in stochastic environments [15] , numerical optimization [16] , web crawling [17] , microassembly path planning [18] , multiagent learning [19] , and in batch sequencing and sizing in just-in-time manufacturing systems [20] .
Initial LA were designed to be Fixed Structure Stochastic Automata (FSSA), whose state update and decision functions are time invariant. The most notable examples of this type include the Tsetlin, Krylov and Krinsky automata [21] . Later, Variable Structure Stochastic Automata (VSSA) were developed, which are characterized by functions that update the probability of selecting the various actions. Representatives of VSSA include the Linear Reward-Penalty (L R−P ) scheme, the Linear Reward-Inaction (L R−I ) scheme, the Linear Inaction-Penalty (L I −P ) scheme and the Linear Reward-εPenalty (L R−εP ) scheme [21] . As one observes, the L R−I and L R−εP schemes assign more importance to reward responses than to penalties; they are also ε-optimal in all stationary environments. This is also the case with FSSA, where, for example, the Krinsky automaton, which treats rewards significantly "more seriously" than penalties, is ε-optimal in all stationary environments, while the Tsetlin automaton, which treats rewards and penalties equally, is only ε-optimal when the largest reward probability is greater than 0.5 [21] .
Among the families of LA, Estimator Algorithms (EAs) work with a noticeably different paradigm, and are certainly the fastest and most accurate. Within this family, the set of Pursuit Algorithms (PAs) were the pioneering schemes, whose design and analysis were initiated by Thathachar and Sastry [22] . EAs augment an action probability updating scheme with the use of estimates of the reward probabilities of the respective actions. The first Pursuit Algorithm (PA) was designed to operate by updating the action probabilities based on the L R−I paradigm. By the same token, being an EA in its own right, the PA maintains running Maximum Likelihood (ML) reward probability estimates, which further determines the current "Best" action for the present iteration. The PA then pursues the current best action by linearly increasing its action probability. As the PA considers both the short-term responses of the Environment and the long-term reward probability estimates in formulating the action probability updating rules, it outperforms traditional VSSA schemes in terms of its accuracy and its rate of convergence.
The most difficult part in the design and analysis of LA consists of the formal proofs of their convergence accuracies. The mathematical techniques used for the various families (FSSA, VSSA, Discretized etc.) are quite distinct. The proof methodology for the family of FSSA is the simplest: it quite simply involves formulating the Markov chain for the LA, computing its equilibrium (or steady state) probabilities, and then computing the asymptotic action selection probabilities. The proofs of convergence for VSSA are more complex and involve the theory of small-step Markov processes, distance diminishing operators, and the theory of Regular functions. The proofs for Discretized LA involve the asymptotic analysis of the Markov chain that represents the LA in the discretized space, whence the total probability of convergence to the various actions is evaluated. However, understandably, the most difficult proofs involve the family of EAs. This is because the convergence involves two intertwined phenomena, namely the convergence of the reward estimates and the convergence of the action probabilities themselves. Ironically, the combination of these vectors in the updating rule is what renders the EA fast. However, if the accuracy of the estimates are poor because of inadequate estimation (i.e., if the sub-optimal actions are not sampled "enough number of times"), the convergence accuracy can be diminished. Hence the dilemma!
The ε-optimality of the EAs, more specifically, the family of Pursuit Algorithms including the Continuous Pursuit Algorithm (CPA) and the Discretized Pursuit Algorithm (DPA), have been studied and presented in [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . The basic result stated in these papers is that by utilizing a sufficiently small/large value for the learning parameter, both the CPA and the DPA will converge to the optimal action with an arbitrarily large probability. However, these proofs have a common flaw, which involves a very fine argument. In fact, the proofs reported in these papers "deduced" the ε-optimality based on the conclusion that after a sufficiently large time instant, t 0 , the probability of selecting the optimal action is monotonically increasing, which, in turn, is based on the condition that the reward probability estimates are ordered properly forever after t 0 . This ordering is, indeed, true by the law of large numbers only if all the actions are chosen infinitely often, which renders the time instant, t 0 , to be infinite also. If such an "infinite" selection does not occur, the ordering cannot be guaranteed for all time instants after t 0 . In other words, the authors of these papers misinterpreted the concept of ordering "forever" with the ordering "most of the time" after t 0 .
As a consequence of this misinterpretation, the condition supporting the monotonicity property is false, which further leads to an incorrect proof for both the CPA and the DPA being ε-optimal. Even though this has been the accepted argument for almost three decades (even by the third author of this present paper who was the principal author of many of the above-mentioned papers), we credit the authors of [2] for discovering this flaw. 1 Further, in [2] , a rectified proof was provided to prove the ε-optimality of the CPA. The rectified proof is based on the monotonicity property of the probability of selecting the optimal action, and further requires an external condition that the learning parameter, λ, is decreasing with time. We respectfully grant credit to these authors for this proof which, to the best of our knowledge, seems to be the only way to prove the ε-optimality of the CPA.
One of the main messages in the paper [2] is that they argue that probability calculations using a fixed t are not enough to show ε-optimality. The reason for this is that so little is known about the dynamics of the process {P (t)|t ≥ 0}, 2 due to the complex dependencies, namely, because {P (t)|t ≥ 0} depends on {D(t)|t ≥ 0} which, in turn, dictates how {P (t )|t ≥ t} is determined. The arguments that the authors of [2] invoke show that by utilizing changing values of λ to control its behavior, they can ensure that the companion process {d j (t)|∀j, t ≥ 0} is eventually properly ordered, i.e., monotonically, forever. Indeed, their arguments demonstrate that any single-t probability calculations cannot capture the "forever" behavior of the monotonicity of these processes. From this perspective, we believe that it is not trivial to extend their arguments even for the submartinagale property if the value of λ is kept fixed. 3 However, the arguments that we present are distinct from the previously-used flawed arguments, because we have not required that the process {d j (t)|t ≥ 0} satisfies the monotonicity property. Rather, by constraining the process to jump to an absorbing barrier in a single step when any p j (t) ≥ T , where T is a user-defined threshold close to unity, we have attempted to demonstrate ε-optimality because of a weaker property, i.e., the submartinagale property of p m (t), where t is greater than a finite time index, t 0 . The latter absorbing version of the CPA will be explained presently.
With this as a background, we now move to the primary intent of this work, i.e., to correct the above-mentioned flaw. However, we shall introduce a new method which can, hopefully, be used to prove the ε-optimality of all EAs which are specifically enhanced with artificially-enforced absorbing states [28] , in particular, the ACPA which is the CPA with artificially-enforced absorbing states. Though the method used in [2] is also applicable for absorbing EAs, we will show that while the monotonicity property is sufficient for convergence, it is not really necessary for proving that the ACPA is ε-optimal. Rather, we will present a completely new proof methodology which is based on the convergence theory of submartingales and the theory of Regular functions [21] . This current proof is, thus, distinct in principle and an argument from the proof reported in [2] . Further, we believe that our proof adds insights into the convergence of different EAs, and that it can be easily extended to formally demonstrate the ε-optimality of all the known EAs which are artificially augmented with absorbing states.
Overview of the ACPA
The ACPA is the CPA with absorbing states that are created artificially as explained below. Just as in the case of the CPA, the ACPA follows a "pursuit" paradigm of learning, which consists of three steps. Firstly, at time t, it maintains an action probability vector P = [p 1 (t), p 2 (t), ..., p r (t)] to determine the issue of which action is to be selected, where j =1...r p j (t) = 1, and where r is the number of actions. Secondly, it maintains running ML reward probability estimates to determine which action can be reckoned to be the "best" in the current iteration. Thirdly, based on the response of the Environment and the knowledge of the current best action, the ACPA increases the probability of selecting the current best action as per the continuous L R−I rules. The only difference between the ACPA and the CPA is that if any one of the action probabilities, p j (t + 1), surpasses the terminating Threshold, T , which is a user-defined quantity set to be very close to unity, p j (t + 1) will jump directly to unity and the learning process is terminated. At this juncture, we say that the LA has been "absorbed" into one of the absorbing barriers, where the r unit vectors are the absorbing states.
When a LA is operating in a stationary environment, i.e., where the reward probability for each action does not change with time, the difference between the CPA and the ACPA is trivial. This is because, in practice, the CPA does not need to run for an infinite number of iterations. Rather, the learning is terminated when one of the action probabilities is greater than or equal to a value that is close to unity, which is equivalent to the concept of the threshold introduced in the ACPA. However, on the other hand, the difference between ACPA and the CPA is of fundamental importance as it provides a very convenient condition using which one is able to analyze the convergence of the pursuit algorithms, and in that sense, the ACPA is more accurate when it concerns defining the learning process which terminates within a finite number of times.
However, when it concerns dynamic environments, i.e., where the reward probabilities change from time to time, the ACPA, due to its absorbing property, is no longer applicable. This is because the CPA, without absorbing barriers, is able (though limitedly) to draw back from a previously-learned optimal action and to adjust itself to a new optimal action. However, the proof of the CPA's convergence in dynamic environments remains unsolved.
We present below the ACPA's notations and description, after which we visit its proof of convergence.
Previous proofs for CPA's ε-optimality
Since the ACPA has all the fundamental properties of the CPA except near the absorbing boundary states, in this section, all the descriptions and statements are made based on the CPA, but are also applicable to the ACPA.
The formal assertions of the ε-optimality of the CPA [27] are stated in Theorem 1, where 't' is measured in terms of the number of iterations.
Theorem 1
Given any ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exist a λ > 0 and a t 0 < ∞ such that for all time t ≥ t 0 and for any positive learning parameter λ < λ ,
The earlier reported proofs for the ε-optimality of the CPA follow the same strategy, which consists of four steps. Firstly, given a sufficiently small value for the learning parameter λ, all actions will be selected enough number of times before a finite time instant, t 0 . Secondly, for all t > t 0 ,d m will remain to be the maximum element of the reward probability estimates vector,D. Thirdly, supposed m has been ranked as the largest element inD since t 0 , the action probability sequence of {p m (t)}, with t > t 0 , will be monotonically increasing, whence one concludes that p m (t) converges to 1 with probability 1. Finally, given that the probability ofd m being the largest element inD is arbitrarily close to unity, and that p m (t) → 1 w.p. 1, ε-optimality is proven based on the axiom of total probability.
The formal assertions of these steps are catalogued below.
1. The first step of the proof can be described mathematically by Theorem 2 for the CPA.
Algorithm ACPA Parameters: α j : The j th action that can be selected by the LA, and is an element from the set {α 1 , . . . α r }. p j : The j th element of the action probability vector P . λ: The learning parameter, where 0 < λ < 1. u j : The number of times α j has been rewarded when it has been selected. v j : The number of times α j has been selected. d j : The j th element of the reward probability estimates vectorD,
The index of the optimal action. h: The index of the greatest element ofD. R: The response from the Environment, where R = 0 corresponds to a Reward, and R = 1 to a Penalty. T : A Threshold, where T ≥ 1 − ε. Initialization: 
Ifd h (t) is the largest element ofD(t), update P (t) as:
.
If any p j (t + 1) ≥ T , make p j (t + 1) jump to 1 and break the loop: The detailed proof for this result can be found in [26] . 2. The sequence of probabilities, {p m (t) (t >t 0 ) }, is stated to be monotonically increasing. The previous proofs attempted to do this by showing that:
|p m (t)| ≤ 1, and
whereĀ(t 0 ) is the condition that after time t 0 , for any j ∈ (1, 2, ..., r),d j remains within a small enough neighborhood of d j so thatd m remains the greatest element inD. If this step of the "proof" was flawless 4 , p m (t) can be shown to converge to 1 w.p. 1. 3. Since p m (t) → 1 w.p. 1, if it can, indeed, be proven that P r{Ā(t 0 )} > 1 − δ, by the axiom of total probability, one can then see that:
and ε-optimality is proven.
According to the sketch of the proof above, the key is to prove P r{Ā(t 0 )} > 1 − δ, i.e.,
In (2), w is defined as the difference between the two highest reward probabilities.
In the proofs reported in the literature, (2) is considered to be true according to the weak law of large numbers, i.e., if each α j has been selected enough number of times, then for ∀j ,
so that 5
However, there is a flaw in the above argument. In fact, if we define 
But, indeed, the condition which (1) is based on is:
which means that for every single time instant in the future, i.e., t > t 0 ,d j (t) (∀j) needs to be within the w 2 neighborhood of d j . The flaw in the previous proofs reported in the literature is that they made a mistake by reckoning that A(t) is equivalent toĀ(t 0 ). This renders the existing proofs for the CPA being ε-optimal, to be incorrect.
The flaw is documented in [2] , which further provided a way of correcting the flaw, i.e., by proving P r{Ā(t 0 )} > 1− δ instead of proving P r{A(t)} > 1−δ. Although their proof requires a sequence of decreasing values for the learning parameter λ, to the best of our knowledge, it currently stands as the only correct way to prove the ε-optimality of the CPA. We applaud the authors of [2] for discovering this flaw, and for submitting an accurate proof for the CPA for the scenario when the λ's are changing with time.
However, the proof methodology that we have used here for the ACPA is quite distinct (and uses completely different techniques) than the proof reported in [2] . The reasons why we have sought an alternate proof are the following:
The monotonicity property which all the previous flawed proofs and the proof in [2] were based on, is indeed, a very strong condition. The condition requires thatd m (t) is ranked as the largest element inD(t) at every single point of time for all t > t 0 , which, in turn, requires that for the CPA to achieve its ε-optimality, one must rely on an additional external assumption that the learning parameter, λ, is gradually decreasing during the learning process. Though there is, currently, no way to circumvent this external constraint so as to prove the CPA's ε-optimality, the fine difference introduced here in creating the ACPA, i.e., enhancing the CPA by incorporating into it artificially-enforced absorbing states, makes it possible for us to prove the ACPA's ε-optimality without including the constraint of decreasing the learning parameter over time.
In the next section, we shall correct the above-mentioned flaw that exists in the previous proofs of EAs. As mentioned, our new proof strategy for the ε-optimality of the ACPA does not require that the learning parameter λ is gradually decreasing.
The new proof is based on the convergence theory of submartingales, and on the theory of Regular functions. The property of moderation can be described precisely by Theorem 2, which have been proven in [26] . This implies that under the ACPA, by utilizing a sufficiently small value for the learning parameter, λ, each action will be selected an arbitrarily large number of times.
The key conditionB(t 0 ) for {p m (t) t>t 0 } being a submartingale
In our proof strategy, instead of examining the condition for {p m (t) t>t 0 } being monotonically increasing, we will investigate the condition for {p m (t) t>t 0 } being a submartingale. By doing this, the previous strong condition required by the authors of [2] , i.e., ofĀ(t 0 ), which asserts that {p m (t) t>t 0 } possesses the property of monotonicity, will not be necessary any longer. Instead, we base our arguments on the weaker submartingale phenomena,B(t 0 ), defined as follows:
Note thatĀ(t 0 ) is stronger thanB(t 0 ) in the sense that the former requires that when t > t 0 ,d j (t) is absolutely within a w 2 neighborhood of d j , while the latter requires thed j (t) to be within a w 2 neighborhood of d j , with an arbitrarily large probability.
Our goal in this step is to prove the following result, formulated in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3
Given aδ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a time instant t 0 < ∞, such that the conditionB(t 0 ) holds. In other words, for this givenδ, there exists a t 0 < ∞, such that ∀t > t 0 :
Proof First of all, we setδ = 1 − r 1 −δ. We observe that ∀t > t 0 , if
We thus need to prove that for ∀t > t 0 and ∀j ,
If we define n j (t) as the number of times α j has been selected up to the time instant t, then by applying the Hoeffding's inequality [29] , we have:
and hence
Then, we only need to set
to certainly have
Besides, from (7), we also have
which means that for a given specific value ofδ , α j needs to be selected for at least −2 lnδ 2 w 2 times to guarantee that q j (t) > 1 −δ .
As the above arguments apply to ∀j ∈ (1, 2, ..., r), we can draw the following conclusion: for the givenδ ∈ (0, 1) andδ = 1 − r 1 −δ, we can define t 0 as a time instant such that within t 0 , each action has been selected for more than
times. If that is the case, thenB(t 0 ) holds, i.e., for ∀t > t 0 , q(t) > 1 −δ, thus proving Theorem 3.
{p m (t) t>t 0 } is a submartingale under the ACPA
We now prove the submartingale properties of {p m (t) t>t 0 } for the ACPA 6 .
Theorem 4
Under the ACPA, the quantity {p m (t) t>t 0 } is a submartingale. 
where p m (t) and q(t) are respectively written as p m and q in the interest of conciseness. Thus,
Invoking the definition of a submartingale, we know that if for all t > t 0 , we have Diff p m (t ) > 0, i.e., q(t)−p m (t) > 0, then {p m (t) t>t 0 } is a submartingale. We now invoke the terminating condition for the ACPA, in which we force the learning process to jump to the absorbing state and attain convergence if p j (t) > T = 1 − ε, (j = 1, 2, ..., r) . Therefore, if we set the quantity (1 −δ) defined in Theorem 3 to be greater than the threshold T , then as per Theorem 3, there exists a time instant t 0 < ∞, such that for every single time instant subsequent to t > t 0 , q(t) > 1 −δ > T > p m (t) , which, in turn, guarantees that {p m (t) t>t 0 } is a submartingale. Hence the result! One may also notice that for the original CPA, i.e., which does not possess artificially created absorbing barriers, the quantity Diff p m (t ) will never be certainly greater than 0. This is because there is no such time instant that after which, q(t) > p m (t) is guaranteed. Consequently, as far as we can see, we do not believe that we can prove the CPA's ε-optimality by invoking the submartingale property alone. It appears as if the method utilized in [2] is currently the only way to achieve this proof. If we denote e j as the unit vector with the j th element being 1, then p m (∞) = 1 is equivalent to the assertion that P (∞) = e m . If we define the convergence probability m (P ) = P r{P (∞) = e m |P (0) = P }, our task is to now prove:
To prove (9), we shall use the theory of Regular functions, and the arguments used follow the lines of the arguments found in [21] for the convergence proofs of Absolutely Expedient schemes.
Let (P ) as a function of P . We define an operator U as
U (P ) = E[ (P (t + 1))|P (t) = P ].
If we now repeatedly apply U , we get the result of the t-step invocation of U as:
We refer to the function (P ) as being:
• Superregular: If U (P ) ≤ (P ). Then applying U repeatedly yields:
• Subregular: If U (P ) ≥ (P ). In this case, if we apply U repeatedly, we have
• Regular: If U (P ) = (P ). In such a case, it follows that:
Moreover, if (P ) satisfies the boundary conditions (e m ) = 1 and (e j ) = 0, (for j = m),
then, as per the definition of Regular functions and the submartingale convergence theory, we have
Comparing (14) with (12), we see that m (P ) is exactly the function (P ) upon which if U is applied an infinite number of times, the sequence of operations will lead to a function that equals the function (P ) itself, because it would then be a Regular function. This observation readily leads us to the conclusion that m (P ) can be indirectly obtained by investigating a Regular function of P . However, as in the case of Absolutely Expedient LA, a Regular function is not easily found, although its existence is guaranteed. Fortunately, (10) and (11) tell us that m (P ), i.e., the Regular function of P , can be bounded from above (below) by the superregular (subregular) function of P . Furthermore, as we are most interested in the lower bound of m (P ), our goal is to find a proper Subregular function of P , which also satisfies the boundary conditions given by (13) , which will then guarantee to bound m (P ) from below.
Consider a specific instantiation of to be the function m , defined below as:
where x m is a positive constant. Then, under the ACPA,
Our task is to determine a proper value for x m such that
This is equivalent to solving the following inequality:
We know that when b > 0 and x → 0,
If we set b = e −x m , when λ → 0, (15) can be re-written as
Substituting b with e −x m , we see that
As x m is defined as a positive constant, we have
If we denote
we have x m 0 > 0, implying that when λ → 0, x m 0 → ∞. We now introduce another function
where x m is the same as defined in m (P ). Moreover, we observe the property that if m (P ) = e −x m p m is a superregular (subregular), then φ m (P ) =
1−e −xmpm 1−e −xm is a subregular (superregular) [21] . Therefore, the quantity x m , as defined in (16) , which renders m (P ) to be superregular, makes the φ m (P ) to be subregular. Therefore, according to (11) ,
As (17) holds for every x m bounded by (16), we take the greatest value x m 0 . Moreover, as λ → 0, x m 0 → ∞, whence m (P ) → 1. We thus shown that P r{p m (∞) = 1} → 1, proving the claim of the theorem! Remark 1 Note that the statement that when λ is maintained as a constant satisfying λ → 0, the conclusion that P r{p m (∞) = 1} → 1 confirms that we do not have to continuously decrease the value λ over time as the proof in [2] requires. This result can be summarized to see that there exists a sufficiently small (but not continuously decreasing value) λ ∈ (0, 1) such that x m 0 will be sufficiently large so as to make m (P ) to be sufficiently close to unity.
Remark 2
Having proven the ACPA's ε-optimality, we can also use the above arguments to provide expressions for t 0 and the number of times each action needs to be selected. Letδ = 1 − r−1 1 −δ, whereδ is the quantity specified in the statement of Theorem 5. Then, the theorem confirms the existence of a time instant, t 0 , where:
and where for this time instant t 0 , we can guarantee that each action will have been selected more than
times.
It should be noted that the quantity t 0 defined in (18) is very conservative. In other words, it has been rendered to be very large to ensure that {p m (t) t>t 0 } is a submartingale. This is consistent with the fact that the learning parameter λ has to be very small to ensure the ACPA's ε-optimality. This is because it is only when λ is sufficiently small that each action will have been "sampled" enough number of times by the time instant t 0 , in which case, the estimates of the reward probabilities can be ordered correctly with an arbitrarily large probability, i.e., greater than 1 −δ, to ensure the submartingale property of {p m (t) t>t 0 }. From this perspective, the rather conservative theoretical assumption for λ leads to an analogous very conservative value for t 0 that is much larger than the actual, practically-obtained value. We will justify this with the following experimental results that are based on the benchmark environments shown in Table 2 . Table 3 shows the comparison between the t 0 calculated from (18) and the average number of iterations needed for the LA to converge, in practice. As the CPA and ACPA are well-established algorithms, we know that numerous experiments have been conducted to confirm their validity, and so we merely use the figures from [30] to record the practical results.
As the reader will observe from Table 3 , the quantity t 0 , though it is not equivalent to the theoretical number of iterations required for the LA to converge, is used as a rough theoretical metric for us to compare the analytic results with the practical results. The reason why we have done this is twofold: Firstly, due to the fact that the state space of the CPA/ACPA is open and varies with time, we are not able to analyze the learning process after t 0 , which makes it impossible for us to calculate the theoretical convergence time and to compare it in a meaningful way to the practical convergence time. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, t 0 is very conservative. In all the experiments we conducted, this index is much larger than the practical convergence time as one can see from Table 3 . For example, in Table 3 and in Conf. 1, when δ is set to be 0.001, each action needs to be selected 435 times by t 0 , which implies that t 0 must be greater than or equal to 1, 740 (i.e., 435 × 4). As opposed to this, the time to converge in practice, obtained by averaging over all the 750 experiments in which the LA converged to the optimal action, was only 654.220, and was much less than t 0 . We can thus confidently affirm that t 0 is, indeed, a very conservative quantity due to the choice of a very small learning parameter. However, we emphasize that t 0 is finite. This implies that within this time, the submartingale property of {p m (t) t>t 0 } can be guaranteed, whence the ε-optimality of the ACPA can be further proven.
Conclusions
Estimator algorithms are acclaimed to be the fastest Learning Automata (LA), and within this family, the set of Pursuit algorithms have been considered to be the pioneering schemes. But, as is well known, the most difficult part in the design and analysis of LA consists of the formal proofs of their convergence accuracies. The ε-optimality of Pursuit algorithms is of fundamental importance and has been studied for years. In almost all the existing papers, the proofs involved in demonstrating the ε-optimality of the Pursuit algorithms have a common flaw. The flaw was discovered by the authors of [2] , whom we applaud for this. While a correct proof has been provided for the CPA in [2] , it requires the scheme's parameter to be constantly decreasing. This paper aims at removing the latter stringent requirement by defining the CPA's modified version, the ACPA, whose boundary states are artificially absorbing. The paper provides a formal proof for the ACPA's ε-optimality.
Rather than examining the monotonicity property of the {p m (t) (t >t 0 ) } sequence as done in the previous papers and in [2] , our current proof studies the submartingale property of {p m (t) (t >t 0 ) }. Accordingly, instead of constraining the reward probability to be ordered correctly forever after a certain time instant, t 0 , we merely require a weaker condition, i.e., one that only requires that the reward probability of the optimal action is ranked as the largest with a sufficiently large probability. Thereafter, by virtue of the submartingale property and the weaker condition, the new proof invokes the theory of Regular functions, and does not require the learning parameter to decrease gradually.
Our current proof is distinct in principle and argument from the proof reported in [2] . We believe that our proof can be easily extended to formally demonstrate the ε-optimality of other Absorbing Estimator Algorithms, without changing their respective learning parameters.
Finally, we suggest that the open unsolved problem lies in understanding the true dynamics of the process {P (t) (t ≥0) } in terms of the complex dependencies between it and {D(t) (t ≥0) }. We believe that a different proof methodology is not possible unless the research community obtains a deeper understanding of the inter-dependencies between both these processes. 
